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Competition in the Telephone Equipment
Industry: Beyond Telerent
In recent years the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
has sought to stimulate competitive entry into the telephone equip-
ment industry1 by requiring communications common carriers to in-
terconnect customer-provided terminal equipment with the telephone
network.2 The common carriers had long resisted interconnection,
insisting that customers obtain terminal equipment exclusively from
them.3 Since the carriers in turn acquired almost all their equipment
from their own manufacturing affiliates 4 they effectively foreclosed
1. The telephone equipment industry manufactures switching, transmission, and
terminal apparatus for use in telephone systems. The first two categories include equip-
ment in the telephone company's central office and the telecommunication links that
make up the message distribution network, while terminal equipment operates on the
customer's premises. This Note will focus on the production and sale or lease of terminal
equipment-items such as the basic handset, teletypewriter equipment, data sets, and
switching equipment servicing only one customer. The major types of switching equip-
ment are private branch exchanges (PBXs), which connect individual stations on a
customer's premises with one another and with the public telephone system, and key
telephone systems (KTS), with "lighted multibutton telephones that allow the user to be
connected to one of several outside or PBX lines." SYsTEMs APPLICATIONS, INC., REGULA-
TORY POLICY CHANGES AND THE FUTURE OF THE INDEPENDENT TELEPHONE INDUSTRY 21-22
(1975). See M. IRWIN, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 27 (1971); Burkhard & Clare,
User Equipment and Services, in COMMUNICATION SYSTEM ENGINEERING HANDBOOK (D.
Hamsher ed. 1967).
The FCC has also encouraged competition in the provision of private line and
satellite communications. See, e.g., Establishment of Domestic Communications Satellite
Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, 18 RAD. REG. (P-H) 2D 1631,
modified, 38 F.C.C.2d 665, 26 RAD. REG. (P-H) 2D 465 (1972); Microwave Communications,
Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953, 16 RAD. REG. (P-H) 2D 1037 (1969). For discussion of private-line
communications, which involves permanent connections among a limited number of data
transmitting stations or basic voice-grade communications terminals, see An Overview of
the Domestic Telecommunications Industry and FCC Policies Concerning Terminal
Devices and Private Line Services, in REPORT BY THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMIS-
SION ON DoEsriC TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICIES 7-76 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Over-
view]. For discussion of satellite communications, see Barrow & Manelli, Communications
Technology-A Forecast of Change (pt. 1), 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 205, 216-24 (1969).
2. For purposes of the Communications Act of 1934, a communications common
carrier is any person or corporation offering services for hire "in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy."
Communications Act of 1934, § 3(h), 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970). The term encompasses all
but the smallest telephone companies.
"Interconnection" is a generic term for linking up equipment or systems with the
principal telephone network. In this Note the term will refer to the connection of tele-
phone equipment on the customer's premises.
3. Trebing, Common Carrier Regulation-The Silent Crisis, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
299, 322-23 (1969). See M. IRWIN, supra note 1, at 67.
4. The American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&.T) includes Bell Labs, a
research unit, the Long Lines Department, which operates most interstate lines, and 23
local operating companies. United States v. AT&T, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1976-2
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entry into the telecommunications equipment market.5 In North
Carolina Utilities Commission v. FCC (Telerent),6 the Fourth Circuit
upheld the Commission's procompetition policy against attempts by
Trade Cas.) ff 61,163, at 70,245 (D.D.C., Nov. 24, 1976). AT&T accounts for over 80% of
all telephone service in this country. M. IRWIN, supra note 1, at 25. It has been vertically
integrated since acquiring Western Electric Co. as its manufacturing affiliate in 1882.
Trebing, supra note 3, at 303. The second largest common carrier, General Telephone &
Electronics Corp. (GT&:E), has acquired several manufacturing affiliates. Irwin & McKee,
Vertical Integration and the Communication Equipment Industry: Alternatives for Public
Policy, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 446, 447 (1968). See Irwin, Vertical Integration and the Com-
inunications Industry: Separation of Western Electric and AT&-T?, 3 ANTITRUST L. & ECON.
REV., Fall 1969, at 125, 131. Three studies by the industry completed since 1973 suggest
that the manufacturing subsidiaries of the carriers sell annually over 90% of the PBXs
and key systems in the nation. Economic Implications and Interrelationships Arising From
Policies and Practices Relating to Customer Interconnection, jurisdictional Separations,
and Rate Structures, FCC Docket No. 20003, app. C at 2 (Sept. 23, 1976) [hereinafter cited
as Economic Implications].
Vertical integration of regulated firms has been criticized for permitting the extension
of a legal monopoly to nonregulated markets, much as illegal "tie-in" sales of patented
articles permit the spreading of the legal patent monopoly to other markets. Irwin &
McKee, supra at 446. Recognizing these dangers, the FCC has forced the common car-
riers to set up independent affiliates in data processing markets and has limited business
dealings between the carriers and such affiliates. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 (1976). This policy
was approved in GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973). Similarly, the
Commission has prevented the carriers from operating community-antenna television
systems (CATV) in their telephone service areas. 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-.57 (1976). The
Fifth Circuit upheld this regulation in General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846
(5th Cir. 1971).
There have been a number of attempts to force AT&T to divest itself of Western
Electric, beginning with an unsuccessful antitrust suit by the Justice Department in
1949. See 45 CORNELL L.Q. 88 (1959). The FCC recently declined to act on the request by
the FCC trial staff that AT&T and Western Electric be separated. Wall St. J., Feb. 24,
1977, at 2, col. 2. The Commission's action followed the preliminary recommendation of
an administrative law judge. AT&T (The Associated Bell System Companies), FCC Docket
No. 19129 (July 14, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Divestiture Proceedings]. In addition, in
its pending suit against AT&T the Justice Department is again asking that Western
Electric be split off from the Bell System. United States v. AT&T, Civ. No. 74-1698
(D.D.C., filed Nov. 20, 1974).
5. The FCC ordered the common carriers to adopt liberal interconnection policies
to permit direct interconnection of all equipment meeting technical requirements. Pro-
posals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Tel. Serv.
(MTS) and Wide Area Tel. Serv. (WATS), 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975), modified, 58 F.C.C.2d
736 (1976). This policy is currently being challenged in the courts. North Carolina Utils.
Comm'n v. FCC, Civ. No. 76-1002 (4th Cir., filed Jan. 2, 1976). The FCC policy also
could be nullified by legislation advocated by the common carriers and endorsed by over
200 members of Congress. S. 3192, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 12816, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976). The felicitously titled "Consumer Communications Reform Act of 1976" was
introduced at the request of the common carriers. It would "reaffirm" congressional in-
tent to afford the states complete authority over terminal equipment, including authority
over devices used partly in interstate service. The legislation would also restrict the
FCC's ability to permit competition between "specialized common carriers" and estab-
lished telephone common carriers in the provision of private-line communication.
The New York Public Service Commission is currently considering adoption of a
liberal interconnection policy that would apply to all carriers in the state. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 15, 1977, at 1, col. 5.
6. 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3427 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1976).
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state regulatory agencies to block interconnection. The court ruled
that the FCC, not the states, had jurisdiction over the telephone com-
panies' interconnection policy.
The Telerent ruling, however, does not end the controversy over
competition in the equipment industry. This Note will show that the
common carriers can still thwart competition by manipulating in-
trastate telephone rates, which are beyond the reach of the FCC, in
order to subsidize equipment prices and thus gain an advantage over
their competitors. In this analysis, subsidization refers to the failure of
a regulated firm to recover its long-run marginal costs7 on a particular
service.8 After examining both the jurisdictional and economic aspects
of Telerent, this Note will argue that the decision delimits a jurisdic-
tional structure that will frustrate any FCC attempts to prevent sub-
sidization. To ensure effective competition in the equipment industry,
the FCC should take administrative action to aid the state regulatory
agencies in monitoring subsidization. In addition, Congress should
grant the FCC limited authority to review the impact on competition
of intrastate telephone rates.
I. The Telerent Litigation
Telerent involved two sets of issues. The Fourth Circuit decided
the jurisdictional question, which was the focus of the litigation, but
never explicitly considered the underlying economic concerns.
A. The Jurisdictional Dispute
Since early in this century, the telephone industry has been regulated
on both the state and federal levels.9 With much interstate and in-
trastate telecommunications service provided over the same trans-
7. For discussion of long-run marginal cost, see pp. 555-58 & notes 75-77, 88-89 infra.
8. Obviously, many definitions of subsidization are possible, depending on the costs
that one decides should be reflected in price. As indicated at pp. 556-58 infra, this Note
adopts a long-run marginal-cost definition because it best captures efficiency considera-
tions. For discussions of the subsidization problem, see Baumol, Eckstein & Kahn, Com-
petition and Monopoly in Telecommunications' Services (1970), reprinted in The Indus-
trial Reorganization Act: Hearings on S. 1167 Before the Subcomn. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1343-44
(1973) [hearings hereinafter cited as Industrial Reorganization Hearings]; Posner, Taxa-
tion by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGNMT. Sc. 22, 24-27 (1971).
9. Federal regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) began in 1910,
Gabel, The Early Competitive Era in Telephone Communication, 1893-1920, 34 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRO8. 340, 355-58 (1969), while state regulation started in Wisconsin in 1907,
1907 Wis. Laws, ch. 499.
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mission and switching facilities, the dual regulatory system has gen-
erated conflict between state and federal regulatory authorities.10 That
conflict resulted in the Telerent litigation, which centered on the
FCC's authority to preempt state regulation of the telephone common
carriers' interconnection policies."
The FCC's efforts to promote competition in the telephone equip-
ment industry began with its 1968 Carterfone decision, which held
that a carrier could not refuse to interconnect a customer-provided
mobile radio-telephone device.' 2 After Carterfone, the carriers per-
mitted interconnection of customer-provided equipment only when a
carrier-provided "interface" device was also installed to protect the
10. Much of this conflict has centered on the issue of service rates. Both federal and
state agencies use rate-of-return regulation to control the carriers' pricing. Compare,
e.g., AT&T, 9 F.C.C.2d 30 (1967) with Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 10 PUB. U. REP.
(PUR) 4TH 255 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n 1975). To calculate the allowed earnings of the
utility, the agency multiplies the fair value of the utility's net property investment
devoted to the provision of telecommunications service (the rate base) by a "reasonable"
rate of return. The permissible rate of return is an amalgam of the cost of borrowed
capital and a reasonable return on the regulated firm's equity. The regulator also
determines the firm's operating expenses and combines that figure with the allowed
earnings to arrive at the firm's revenue requirement. Rates are then set to meet this
revenue requirement. Cunningham, The Anatomy of a Utility Rate Case, in THE Nmw
ECONOMICS OF REGULATED INDUSTRIEs 21, 28-36, 40-46 (J. Haring ed. 1968).
Since intrastate and interstate telephone messages often use the same equipment,
federal and state regulators face the recurring problem of "separating" the costs of such
equipment between AT&T's Long Lines Department, which handles long-distance, prin-
cipally interstate traffic, and the local telephone companies, whose main business is in-
trastate communications. The separations process is crucial to establishing the rate
bases on which the intrastate and interstate rates are calculated. The more capital equip-
ment cost assigned to the interstate rate base, the higher the carrier's permissible inter-
state rates and, assuming coordination between state and federal authorities, the lower
the permissible intrastate rates will be. In their efforts to keep service rates low within
their respective jurisdictions, the state commissions and the FCC have frequently locked
horns over proper separations procedures. Spychalski, The NARUC: Contributor to Ef-
fective Regulation? A Retrospective and Prospective Critique, in A CRITIQUE OF AD-
MINtSTRATiVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITI-S 89, 106-12 (V. Samuels & H. Trebing eds.
1972).
11. 537 F.2d at 790-95. See Sherdon v. Dann, 193 Neb. 768, 773-78, 229 N.V.2d 531,
534-37 (1975). For discussion of state regulatory attitudes, see pp. 552-53 & notes 64-68 infra.
12. 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 13 RAD. REG. (P-H) 2D 597, aff'd, 14 F.C.C.2d 571, 14 RAn. RaG.
(P-H) 2D 185 (1968). The Carterfone device linked a telephone receiver to a radio,
permitting communication between a caller and someone miles away from the receiver.
When the common carriers refused to permit use of the device, the manufacturer sued
them for antitrust violations. Both the district and circuit courts held that the FCC's
primary jurisdiction over interconnection policy barred judicial consideration of the
antitrust claim prior to Commission review of the carriers' interconnection policy. Carter
v. AT&T, 250 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 365 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1008 (1967). The FCC concluded that the Carterfone device met an unsatisfied
market demand and would not have adverse engineering effects on the telephone system.
13 F.C.C.2d at 423, 13 RAD. REG. (P-H) 2D at 601. Accordingly, the Commission ordered
the carriers to permit interconnection of the device and to revise their general inter-
connection policy. Id.
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telephone system from disruption due to faulty equipment. 13 The
growth of competition after Carterfone was slow,' 4 but by 1974 the
FCC's policy had been sufficiently successful to prompt preliminary
rulings by the North Carolina Utilities Commission and the Nebraska
Utilities Commission banning interconnection of customer-provided
equipment. 15 The North Carolina commission contended that the
present phone network had performed satisfactorily without intercon-
nection.16 The Nebraska commission relied on an opinion by the state
attorney general that the FCC's jurisdiction did not extend to terminal
equipment.17 In response, the FCC reasserted its jurisdiction over an
interstate carrier's interconnection policy. The Commission argued
that since telephone equipment "is used in common and indivisibly
for all local and long distance telephone calls," the state interconnec-
tion rulings covered interstate as well as intrastate service, conflicting
with the FCC's plenary authority over the nationwide telephone net-
work. 18 The states challenged FCC jurisdiction on the basis of § 2(b)
13. See note 33 infra.
Without approving the carriers' modified interconnection policy, the FCC permitted
it to take effect. AT&T, 15 F.C.C.2d 605, 611, 15 RAn. REG. (P-H) 2o 91, 97 (1968). Pro-
ponents of interconnection claimed that interfaces were unnecessary and that the carriers
had delayed production of interfaces to deter customers from providing their own equip-
ment. Industrial Reorganization Hearings, supra note 8, pt. 5, at 2897, 2900 (1974) (letter
of W. Jacobsen, TeleResources, Inc.), 2778-91 (affidavits of employees of Arcata Com-
munications, Inc.). In 1975 the FCC concluded that interface devices were unnecessary
and moved to ensure the technical integrity of the national telephone network by in-
stituting a national certification scheme. Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Inter-
state and Foreign Message Toll Tel. Serv. (MTS) and Wide Area Tel. Serv. (WATS), 56
F.C.C.2d 593 (1975), modified, 58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976).
14. Economic Implications, supra note 4, at 61.
15. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n, No. P-100, Sub 31 (undated), reprinted in Brief
for Respondents at 3a-8a, North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.
1976) [hereinafter cited as North Carolina Challenge]; Sherdon v. Ben Franklin Hotel,
No. 1078 (Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 15, 1974), rev'd sub nom. Sherdon v. Dann, 193
Neb. 768, 229 N.W.2d 531 (1975), reprinted in Brief for Respondents at 13a-17a, North
Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Nebraska
Challenge].
16. North Carolina Challenge, supra note 15, at 4a.
17. 537 F.2d at 790. In the action before the Nebraska commission, interconnection
of a customer-provided switchboard system in a motel was terminated under NEB. REV.
STAT. § 75-604 (1971), which bars interconnection of telephone systems without prior
commission approval. Nebraska Challenge, supra note 15, at 15a.
18. Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204, 215, 29 RAn. REG. (P-H) 2o 553, 566
(1974), aff'd sub nom. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4tlh Cir. 1976);
Brief for Respondents at 25-31, North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th
Cir. 1976). The FCC based its authority on its mandate under the Communications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-205 (1970), to ensure that carriers follow "just and reasonable"
practices. The Commission interpreted that mandate in its Telerent ruling:
[IT]he Commission's powers to regulate interstate and foreign communications services
are comprehensive and pervasive and embrace the terms and conditions under which
customers shall be reasonably permitted to use their own equipment in connection
with such services.
45 F.C.C.2d at 217.
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of the Communications Act, which denies the FCC authority over
intrastate communications. 9
A divided court of appeals found that § 2(b) preserved exclusive
state control only over matters "that in their nature and effect are
separable from and do not substantially affect the conduct or develop-
ment of interstate communications."2 0 The majority accepted the
Commission's argument that since almost all telephone equipment is
used for communications both within and across state boundaries, 21
equipment policies necessarily affect interstate communication. The
FCC had thus properly exercised its authority.22 The court also em-
19. Communications Act of 1934 § 2(b), 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1970) provides:
[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission
jurisdiction with respect to (1) charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or
regulations for or in connection with intrastate commuhications service by wire or
radio of any carrier ....
For arguments of AT&T and the state commissions on the interpretation of this section,
see Brief for Petitioners at 26-33, North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787
(4th Cir. 1976).
20. 537 F.2d at 793.
21. Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204, 214-15, 29 RAD. REG. (P-H) 2D 553, 566
(1974). For example, the basic telephone handset can be used for local or interstate calls.
22. Because the legislative history is ambiguous, the court appropriately deferred to
the agency's interpretation of the statute. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157, 177-78 (1968). There is evidence that Congress did not intend to restrict FCC
authority where federal and state concerns overlapped. Section 2(b) first appeared in an
amendment by Senator Clark to the Senate version of the Communications Act, providing
that "small, independent telephone companies" would not be subjected to federal regula-
tion. Senator Dill, floor manager of the bill, accepted the amendment because "its only
purpose is to accomplish that which we have tried to do throughout the bill, that is, to
protect the independent companies." 78 CONG. Rrc. 8847 (1934). Clearly, both men saw
the section as preventing federal regulation of small "Morn and Pop" telephone com-
panies, not as granting to the states exclusive power over all intrastate operations of
common carriers. See id. at 10313 (Rep. Rayburn); Sherdon v. Dann, 193 Neb. 768,
229 N.W.2d 531 (1975) (federal primacy over telephone equipment); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. State, 207 Ga. 675, 682, 63 S.E.2d 878, 883 (1951) (under § 2(b) FCC should
have jurisdiction over all equipment used in both intrastate and interstate service).
The petitioners in Telerent maintained that § 2(b) was intended to foreclose FCC
authority over any intrastate activities. Brief for Petitioners at 20-27, North Carolina
Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976). The strongest support for this posi-
tion appears in SEN. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934), explaining that under
§ 2(b), "the Act is applicable . . . to interstate and foreign communications, but
reserves to the States exclusive jurisdiction over intrastate telephone and telegraph com-
munications." Compare H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934).
Judge Widener, dissenting in Telerent, concluded that § 221(b) of the Communications
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 221(b) (1970), barred the FCC from regulating equipment used for inter-
state and intrastate service. 537 F.2d at 796-99. The provision prohibits the FCC from
exercising jurisdiction over local exchanges "even though a portion of such exchange
service constitutes interstate or foreign communication, in any case where such matters
are subject to regulation by a State commission or by local governmental authority." Id.
at 797 (emphasis added). Section 3(r) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 153(r)
(1970), defines telephone exchange service as "within a telephone exchange, or within a
connected system of telephone exchanges . . . operated to furnish . . . service of the
character ordinarily furnished by a single exchange." The Telerent majority rejected
Judge Widener's position, pointing out that § 221(b) only grants jurisdiction to the
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phasized that the FCC had consistently asserted jurisdiction over tele-
phone equipment used jointly for interstate and intrastate service,23
often with the tacit approval of the courts.24 Finally, the court noted,
Congress provided for referral of such joint jurisdiction problems to a
panel of state utility and FCC commissioners. 25 If § 2(b) barred FCC
jurisdiction over all matters involving intrastate service, no joint
jurisdiction problems could ever arise.2 6
The FCC's control over equipment, though, is not unlimited. Sec-
tion 2(b) places intrastate rates within the exclusive domain of the
states, and although the issue was not in dispute in Telerent, the court
acknowledged that exclusivity.2 7 Since terminal equipment is leased by
local carriers, rates charged by the local telephone companies for
that equipment-like rates for local telephone service-will still fall
within the authority of the state commissions rather than the FCC.
B. Economic Issues
Beneath the jurisdictional wrangling of Telerent lay the question
of the future structure of the equipment industry. The FCC asserted
states over local exchange service that straddles state lines, as in the Washington, D.C./
Virginia/Maryland area. 537 F.2d at 795. See SEN. RaP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1934); H.R. RaP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934) (Section 221(b) "will enable
[state] commissions, where authorized to do so, to regulate exchange services in metro-
politan areas overlapping State lines.")
23. 537 F.2d at 794-95. The FCC asserted authority over telephone equipment policy
in United States Dep't of Defense v. General Tel. Co., 38 F.C.C.2d 803, 26 RAD. REa. (P-H)
2D 245, modified, 39 F.C.C.2d 843 (1973); Carterfone, 14 F.C.C.2d 571, 14 RAD. RaE. (P-H)
2D 185 (1968); AT&T-TWX, 38 F.C.C. 1127 (1965); AT&:T-Railroad Interconnection, 32
F.C.C. 337 (1962); Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. AT&T, 22 F.C.C. 112 (1957); Katz v. AT&T, 8
RAD. REG. (P-H) 919 (1953); and Use of Recording Devices, 11 F.C.C. 1033 (1947). But see
Doniphan Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 34 F.C.C. 949 (1963), adopting opinion in 34 F.C.C. 950
(1962) (FCC lacked jurisdiction over local Missouri telephone company's request that its
interconnection with Bell System be altered); Jordaphone Corp. of America v. AT&T,
18 F.C.C. 644 (1954) (since automatic answering devices would handle mostly intrastate
calls, FCC need not act to protect interstate service).
24. The courts deferred to the FCC's primary jurisdiction over telecommunications
equipment in Carter v. AT&T, 250 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Tex.), afj'd, 365 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1008 (1967). See note 12 supra. Similarly the FCC's jurisdiction
over automatic dialing devices was acknowledged in Macom Prods. Corp. v. AT&T, 359
F. Supp. 973, 977 (C.D. Cal. 1973). In Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. FCC, 238 F.2d 266, 267
(D.C. Cir. 1956), the court, in rejecting an FCC finding that a telephone speaker guard
endangered the integrity of the phone network, implicitly conceded the FCC's authority
over such equipment.
25. 537 F.2d at 795. Under 47 U.S.C. § 410 (Supp. V 1975) the FCC may convene such
"joint boards" at its discretion.
26. Since the enactment of 47 U.S.C. § 410(c) (Supp. V 1975) in 1971, Joint Boards
have been used to handle the problem of separating interstate toll revenues between local
operating companies and AT&T's Long Lines Department. See note 10 supra.
27. 537 F.2d at 793 n.6 ("Of course, rate making typifies those activities of the tele-
phone industry which lend themselves to practical separation of the local from the
interstate in such a way that local regulation of one does not interfere with national
regulation of the other.")
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jurisdiction in order to promote competition in an industry in which
the carriers' vertical integration has stifled competitive entry. The
states, on the other hand, claimed jurisdiction in order to block
interconnection and restore a noncompetitive situation. The FCC
policy has greater merit.
A telephone company's local transmission and switching system
constitutes a natural monopoly. Like most natural monopolies, it has
significant economies of scale 28 and a distribution system entailing
physical connection between customer and supplier, which cannot be
duplicated economically. 29 Regulation permits realization of the ef-
ficiencies of the natural telephone monopoly but prevents the regulated
telephone company from "raising prices to levels which exploit its
monopoly position." 30 The efficiency rationale for regulation, how-
ever, extends only as far as the natural monopoly. 31 It does not carry
over into the telephone equipment industry, which, like most manu-
facturing industries, does not have the scale economies or distribution
system characteristic of a natural monopoly. 32 Telephone equipment
in many ways resembles electrical appliances that can be plugged into
28. The critical characteristic of natural monopoly has been defined as "an inherent
tendency to decreasing unit costs over the entire extent of the market." 2 A. KAHN, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 119 (1970). See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PR FORMANCE 520 (1970) (in natural monopoly "long-run unit cost function
declines continuously out to a scale of output which saturates potential market demand").
Kahn argues that although telephone service exhibits increasing costs if the output is
measured in terms of the number of customers, the more accurate approach recognizes
that the addition of each new subscriber improves the quality of telephone service for
all subscribers by increasing the number of stations that can be reached. Thus, local
telephone service is a natural monopoly under the decreasing-cost criterion because the
costs of adding an additional subscriber are more than offset by the consequent benefits
conferred on other telephone users. 2 A. KAHN, supra, at 123-24.
29. As Kahn observes:
[1]f there were two telephone systems serving a community, each subscriber would
have to have two telephone instruments, two lines into his home, two bills if he
wanted to be able to call everyone else .... [M]onopoly is . . . natural because one
company can serve any given number of subscribers (for example, all in a com-
munity) at lower cost than two.
2 A. KAHN, supra note 28, at 123 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original). See J. BON-
BRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 4-5, 12-13 (1961).
30. F. SCHERER, supra note 28, at 520.
31. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 28, at 151-52 ('The economic ideal would clearly be for
the area of natural monopoly to be defined as narrowly as possible .... )
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3119 (1976), the Supreme Court asserted
that the competitive standards of the antitrust laws can be applied to nonmonopoly
aspects of an electric utility's business and implicitly recognized the validity of confining
regulation to natural monopolies.
32. Hearings on H.R. 12323 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1976) (A. Kahn,
Chairman, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n); Industrial Reorganization Hearings, supra note 8,
pt. 6, at 3841 (1974) (Clay Whitehead, Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy);
see Turner, The Role of Antitrust Policy in the Communications Industry, 13 ANTITRUST
BULL. 873, 877 (1968); note 28 supra.
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the electric power system's terminals in homes and businesses. As long
as technical specifications protect the network from dangers posed by
interconnection of defective or incompatible equipment, the telephone
subscriber should be free to purchase equipment on the open market.33
A policy confining regulation to natural monopoly aspects of the
telephone industry would promote lower prices, greater product di-
versity, and a higher rate of innovation than one limiting all tele-
communications submarkets to one or a small number of suppliers.34
Even though the competitive equipment industry is still in its infancy,
prices have declined for some types of equipment and the variety of
33. AT&T has invoked the specter of technical damage to the transmission and switch-
ing system in opposing introduction of a broad range of equipment by suppliers not
affiliated with the common carriers. Among tse possible dangers to "system integrity"
posed by defective equipment might be erratic voltage generation on telephone lines,
improper network control signaling, and poor service due to distortion of signals. Brief
of Petitioners at 69-70, North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, No. 76-1002 (4th Cir., filed
Jan. 2, 1976).
Historically, however, the carriers have overstated their argument. They have failed
in attempts to use the system-integrity issue to block competitors from supplying plastic
covers for telephone directories, State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. National Merchandising
Corp., 288 N.C. 715, 723-24, 220 S.E.2d 304, 309-10 (1975), and cup-shaped telephone
speaker guards designed to provide greater privacy, Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. FCC, 238
F.2d 266, 268-69 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
In deference to the system-integrity argument, the FCC, after Carterfone, permitted
AT&T to require protective interface devices on all customer-provided equipment. AT&T,
15 F.C.C.2d 605, 15 RAn. REG. (P-H) 2D 91 (1968). An FCC-sponsored study suggested that
a possible alternative to interfaces might be "enforced certification [of the reliability) of
user-supplied equipment and personnel." National Academy of Sciences, A Technical
Analysis of The Common Carrier/User Interconnections Area 56 (1970), reprinted in
Affidavit of Scott Shepherd at Attachment K, II Appendix Annexed to Defendants'
Memorandum Submitted Pursuant to the Court's Order of Feb. 27, 1975, United States
v. AT&T, Civ. No. 74-1698 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 20, 1974). Five years later, the FCC
abandoned the interface requirement in favor of direct interconnection of certified equip-
ment. Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Tel.
Serv. (MTS) and Wide Area Tel. Serv. (WATS), 56 F.C.C.2d 593, 598-99 (1975), nodified,
58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976). The FCC reasoned that many "special" entities, such as other
utilities and government agencies, had directly interconnected their equipment for years
without harm to the system. The FCC also noted that many non-Bell carriers using non-
Bell equipment had interconnected with the Bell network without difficulty. Indeed,
telephone systems in foreign nations have long followed such liberal interconnection
policies. See STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, REPORT RE INSIGHT INTO TELEPHONE INTER-
CONNECTION INDUSTRY (1970), reprinted in Industrial Reorganization Hearings, supra note
8, pt. 6, at 4654, 4671-73 (1974); Research Institute of Telecommunications and Economics,
Customer-Owned Equipment Interconnection in Japan, reprinted in Industrial Re-
organization Hearings, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 1089-95 (1973).
The FCC's certification program has been suspended pending the outcome of a court
challenge. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, Civ. No. 76-1002 (4th Cir. Apr. 29,
1976) (order granting injunction).
34. Baumol, Eckstein & Kahn, supra note 8, at 1333-47. See Rochester Tel. Corp., 94
PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 3D 370, S77 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972) (approving liberalization
of interconnection policy on grounds that "freer competition will afford subscribers a
wider choice of equipment .. will stimulate innovation . . . . and will promote reduc-
tions in cost").
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products offered has broadened.3 5 And despite the adequate innova-
tion performance of the Bell System, competition is likely to provide
a stronger incentive to innovate.3 6 An unregulated firm can exploit
any new product or improved efficiency without the ceiling on profits
imposed by regulation."7 Further, unlike the regulated company, the
competitive firm that sells rather than leases equipment is less tied to
a particular technology and is thus not deterred from innovation.38
Finally, a competitive market provides a valuable diversity of ap-
proaches to technical and economic problems.3 0
Opponents of the FCC's interconnection policy have presented no
substantial argument denying that interconnection should enhance
35. For example, the pre-Carterfone price of carrier-provided answering machines was
approximately $500. By 1976, after a period of high inflation, competition had driven
the price down to $410. Overview, supra note 1, at 67-68. Further, the Southern New
England Telephone Company has reported saving $2.1 million in one year by purchasing
equipment from non-Bell suppliers. Divestiture Proceedings, supra note 4, at 185. The
New York Telephone Company achieved a higher return on its equipment-leasing
business when it switched from Western Electric PBXs to similar equipment manufactured
by Nippon Electric. Id. at 190. See id. at 192, 512 n.167; Proposals for New or Revised
Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Tel. Serv. (MTS) and Wide Area Tel.
Serv. (WATS), 35 F.C.C.2d 539, 542 (1972) (FCC claims that Carterfone opened industry
to greater innovation and product variety).
New equipment available after Carterfone includes a telephone terminal specially
designed for the deaf, developed in the mid-1960s by a California doctor. The carriers
have never marketed the device, but independent firms have sold more than 20,000. Brief
for Respondents at 91-92, North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, Civ. No. 76-1002 (4th
Cir., filed Aug. 16, 1976) (reprinting letter from FCC Chairman Wiley to Rep. Van
Deerlin (May 25, 1976)).
36. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 28, at 149; Shepherd, The Competitive Margin in Com-
munications, in TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 86, 117-18 (W. Capron
ed. 1971). See generally Irwin g: McKee, supra note 4, at 452-57 (case studies criticizing
Bell's innovation performance in monopoly markets).
37. Even though Western Electric is not subject to direct regulatory control, there is
an increasing trend among state commissions to regulate it indirectly by excluding from
a carrier's rate base any part of the price of Western Electric equipment that the
commissions deem excessive. See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 53 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 3D
513 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1964), afrd sub nom. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public
Utils. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 401 P.2d 353, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965); New York Tel. Co.,
2 Pun. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH I (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973); Pacific Northwest Bell Tel.
Co. v. Sabin, 534 P.2d 984 (Or. App. 1975); Note, Treatment of Affiliated Transactions in
Utility Rate Making: Western Electric Company and the Bell System, 56 B.U. L. REv. 558,
568-71 (1976).
38. Shepherd, supra note 36, at 108. Although Western Electric sells its equipment to
the carriers, the carriers lease equipment to their customers. In the absence of competi-
tion, there is insufficient demand by Western Electric's primary customers (the carriers)
for innovation, and concomitantly, less incentive for Western Electric to innovate.
39. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. Rlv. 548, 582 (1969)
(since research and development involve trial and error, variety of approaches is more
valuable than one large research effort). The FCC articulated similar views in Domestic
Communications Satellite Facilities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, 847, 24 RAn. REG. (P-H) 2D 1942,
1946 (1972). See F. SCHERER, supra note 28, at 363-78 (after reviewing empirical literature
on innovation and market structure concludes that multifirm structure is optimal for in-
novation).
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both product variety and innovation.4 0 Their case against liberal in-
terconnection hinges on two contentions. First, they assert, although
some aspects of the industry may not be part of a natural monopoly,
the nation's entire telecommunications network must be centrally
organized and planned in order to develop the full potential of the
system.41 In addition, interconnection opponents contend that be-
cause the common carriers subsidize basic telephone exchange service 42
with revenues from the leasing of PBXs, key systems and extension
phones, 43 competition in the provision of terminal equipment will
significantly increase the price of exchange service.44 These predictions
have been criticized for methodological shortcomings, however, and
for the disparity between the enormity of the predicted loss and the
fractional size of the competitive sectors of the telecommunications
40. The president of Bell Telephone Laboratories asserted before a congressional
subcommittee in 1974 that the regulation of telecommunications has facilitated superior
innovation performance in the industry, in contrast to the innovation record in the com-
petitive garment industry. Industrial Reorganization Hearings, supra note 8, pt. 6, at 4347,
4.51-52 (1974). The relative potentials for innovation in the high-technology communica-
tions industry compared to the labor-intensive clothing industry render the comparison
patently absurd. The Bell spokesman further undercut his point by stressing that the
major recent innovation in the garment industry-synthetic fiber-was developed by the
chemical industry. But that industry, too, is unregulated. The National Academy of
Sciences concluded that interconnection "should not significantly impede innovation by
the carriers and may promote innovation by users." National Academy of Sciences, supra
note 33, at 12.
41. Domestic Common Carrier Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7047 Before the Sub-
comm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 222 (1975) (statement of E.B. Crosland, senior vice-president, AT&T)
[hereinafter cited as Carrier Regulation Hearings]. The panel of experts that wrote the
1970 National Academy of Sciences report, however, concluded that interconnection would
not hamper the technical or innovation performance of the telecommunications industry.
National Academy of Sciences, supra note 33, at 3.
42. An "exchange" is "a unit . . .for the administration of communication service in
a specified area which usually embraces a city, town, or village and its environs." J.
MARTIN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE COMPUTER 444 (1969).
43. Davidson & Kraus, New Approaches to Telephone Regulation by State Commis-
sions, PUB. UTILS. FORT., Jan. 17, 1974, at 36; Moulton, Monopoly and Competition Issues
Facing the Communications Industries, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 889, 892 (1968); National
Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs (NARUC), Report After Investigation (May 15, 1974),
reprinted in Industrial Reorganization Hearings, supra note 8, pt. 6, at 4460, 4505-19
(1974) [report hereinafter cited as NARUC Report]; SYSTEMS APPLIcATIONS, INC., supra
note 1, at 25-31.
44. An AT&T study estimated that as a result of competition in equipment and
private-line communications, average residential subscriber charges would increase more
than 70%, from $7.85 a month to $13.70. Carrier Regulation Hearings, supra note 41, at
263-64 (statement of Prof. E.V. Rostow). NARUC estimated that competition in terminal
equipment markets would reduce the subsidy to basic exchange service by a total of $2.4
billion between 1975 and 1980. NARUC Report, supra note 43, at 4515.
Both NARUC and the United States Independent Telephone Association have also
expressed dismay that under current separations practices (see note 10 supra) the local
carriers may lose part of their share of interstate revenues as the result of interconnec-
tion. NARUC Report, supra note 43, at 4508-10; SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS, INC., supra note
1, at 25. But see Industrial Reorganization Hearings, supra note 8, pt. 6, at 4615 (1974)
(John Cosgrove, Tate Communications).
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industry.45 Indeed, there is evidence that, contrary to Bell's claims,
residential phone service subsidizes equipment services. 46
Even assuming that Bell's claims are accurate, such subsidization is
inefficient and thus costly to the consumer. 47 The monopoly profits
claimed by Bell in the equipment industry, which has been insulated
from competitive entry, indicate that resources have been diverted
from that area.48 The low, subsidized price for monopoly services in-
duces consumers to use more of those services than they would if
charged prices reflecting the total costs of those services. 40 Moreover,
45. John Eger, then Acting Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy,
called the Bell estimates "grossly exaggerated," noting that the estimates are based on an
assumption-uncertain at best-that AT&T will lose large parts of both competitive and
monopoly service revenues, and that the figures do not take account of decreased costs
accompanying any such decline in business. 122 CONG. REC. E3113 (daily ed. June 4, 1976).
The NARUC study on interconnection (cited at note 43 supra), which largely echoed
Bell's dire prediction, has been criticized for assuming that equipment rates prior to
competition were higher than required to cover costs, and for failing to deduct cost
reductions that would accompany any revenue losses. Industrial Reorganization Hearings,
supra note 8, pt. 6, at 4613-15 (1974) (John Cosgrove, Tate Communications).
In 1975, independent telephone equipment companies accounted for only 0.4% of all
equipment sales. All competitive telecommunications markets represented less than 12%
of the total revenue of the Bell System, and only $4 billion of the $35 billion of tele-
phone industry revenues in 1975. 122 COxG. REc. S7326 (daily ed. May 17, 1976) (re-
printing address by Richard Wiley, Chairman of the FCC, before the Int'l Communica-
tions Ass'n). Although competitive services may grow in proportion to monopoly services
if private-line communications expand as a substitute for long-distance service, any
foreseeable reduction in the carriers' revenues resulting from competition would not
seem to require the drastic realignment of basic phone service rates predicted by Bell.
Moreover, even if AT&T's share of the equipment market has declined, rapid ex-
pansion of the entire market has meant higher total revenues from equipment. The
market for telecommunications equipment grew by more than 50% between 1970 and
1975 as a result of competition. Economic Implications, supra note 4, at 61, 137. As a
consequence of this dramatic growth, AT&T's 1975 "increase in revenue for private-line
and terminal-equipment services . . . was more than double the total revenues of all
competing suppliers of these services." 122 CONG. REC. S7327 (daily ed. May 17, 1976).
-46. Economic Implications, supra note 4, at 147-48. After examining studies by the
carriers and NARUC that found monopoly services supported by surplus equipment
revenues, and opposite findings by the New York Public Service Commission staff and
the Office of Telecommunications Policy, the FCC concluded that equipment services
"are probably recipients of subsidy or contribution from either interstate telephone
service or basic local telephone services." Id. at 147. As the FCC acknowledged, however,
the studies are a methodological quagmire, often using ill-defined or even contradictory
cost-allocation procedures. Id. at 123. The conclusions, therefore, must be regarded as
tentative.
47. Baumol, Reasonable Rules for Rate Regulation: Plausible Policies for an Imperfect
World, in THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 187, 196-200 (P. MacAvoy ed.
1970) (all utility services must be compensatory to achieve efficiency); Lerner, Conflicting
Principles of Public Utility Rate Regulation, in id. at 18, 19 (utility prices should equal
marginal costs).
48. Without barriers to entry, competitive entry would take place until the price of
equipment services equaled the marginal cost of providing them. Scherer, supra note 28,
at 18-19; Posner, supra note 39, at 609.
49. There may be social or political reasons for providing residential telephone service
below cost (e.g., to encourage interaction among citizens). The decision to subsidize should
not be made by a private entity, however, but should be in the hands of a publicly ac-
countable body. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 28, at 151.
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under Bell's asserted pricing policy, most of the higher equipment
costs for businesses may simply be passed along to consumers in the
form of higher prices for other goods. When all businesses face the
same inflated costs, they will include as much of that expense in their
prices as the demand for their goods permits.50 Indeed, if the residen-
tial customer would pay more for her phone service without Bell's
claimed subsidization, she would probably pay less for other products.
II. After Telerent
Telerent upheld the FCC's authority over equipment but acknowl-
edged state jurisdiction over intrastate rates. Within this jurisdictional
framework, the decision may prove a Pyrrhic victory for the FCC. The
communications common carriers can undermine competition by sup-
porting artificially low prices in the terminal-equipment market with
revenues from intrastate monopoly services.5 ' The carriers can engage
in such predatory pricing in competitive markets5 2 because the earn-
ings permitted under regulation are calculated as a percentage rate of
return on the operating company's rate base.53 To the extent that the
regulator permits the carriers to control rates of return on individual
services, subject to the overall rate-of-return constraint, the carriers can
recoup losses in competitive markets by pricing well above cost in
monopoly markets where the demand for services is relatively inelas-
tic. 5 4 And under rate-of-return regulation, expansion of the capital base
through greater participation in competitive markets-even participa-
tion at a loss-can increase the total allowed earnings of the carrier.5
50. Cf. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 387-89 (9th ed. 1973) (amount of sales tax passed on
to consumers depends on responsiveness of demand to changes in price).
51. Trebing, supra note 3, at 327, anticipated such difficulties after Carterfone, pre-
dicting that:
[t]he problem will be to prevent extortionate rates in the provision of monopoly
services. . . . For example, depreciation charges for obsolete plant could be written
off against the monopoly sector, while the competitive services enjoy the benefits of
new technology through low prices. This would distort the incidence of the costs
and benefits of technology. Similarly, prices could be set below long-run marginal
cost, thereby permitting the monopoly service to subsidize the efforts of the carrier
in highly competitive markets.
See Melody, Interservice Subsidy: Regulatory Standards and Applied Economics, in Es-
SAYS ON PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING AND REGULATION 167, 205-10 (H. Trebing ed. 1971);
Posner, supra note 39, at 605.
52. Noll & Rivlin, Regulating Prices in Competitive Markets, 82 YALE L.J. 1426, 1427
(1972).
53. See note 10 supra.
54. Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Restraint, 52 A..
ECON. REV. 1052, 1058-59, 1063-66 (1962); Posner, supra note 39, at 615.
55. Averch 9- Johnson, supra note 54, at 1058, pointed out that if the regulator focuses
only on the firm's overall rate of return, the firm
may have an incentive (that it would not have in the absence of regulation) to
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In fact, it has been argued that the common carriers have used
monopoly revenues to subsidize product lines in competitive interstate
markets. A few months after the FCC's decision in 1959 to permit
competition in provision of private microwave transmission systems, 56
American Telephone 9. Telegraph Co. cut prices of competitive ser-
vices so drastically that the FCC found that it had engaged in unreason-
able price discrimination.5 7 On the intrastate level, local telephone
operating companies may currently be subsidizing competitive equip-
ment services beyond the reach of the FCC. Analyses of five different
Bell company pricing policies in the last few years suggest several
possible guises for subsidization of equipment prices, such as absorb-
ing losses in the equipment business without requesting higher rates,55
or cutting or maintaining equipment prices while raising monopoly
service charges.59 Further, some telephone companies have understated
enter these other markets, even if the cost of so doing exceeds the additional revenues.
Expanding into other markets may enable the firm to inflate its rate base ... and
permit it to earn a greater total constrained profit than would have been possible in
the absence of second markets.
56. Allocation of Frequencies in Bands Above 890 Mcs., 27 F.C.C. 359, 18 RAn. REG.
(P-H) 1767 (1959), modified, 29 F.C.C. 825, 20 RAn. RFG. (P-H) 1602 (1960).
57. Telpak, 23 F.C.C.2d 606, 19 RAD. BREG. (P-H) 2D 381 (1970), aff'd sub nom. AT&T
v. FCC, 449 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1971). Kahn has criticized the FCC for failing to articulate
the basis of its judgment in Telpak. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 28, at 156-58. He also suggests
that if the FCC had used a cost-allocation method based on long-run marginal cost (see
pp. 555-58 & notes 75-77, 88-89 infra), the Commission's analysis might not have indicated
that Bell's competitive response permitted subsidization. 1 A. KAHN, 9upra note 28, at
156-58. See Note, Resale and Sharing of Private Line Communications Services: AT&T
Restriction and FCC Regulation, 61 U. VA. L. REy. 679, 689-92 (1975).
58. The New York State Public Service Commission staff determined that New York
Telephone's revenues from the terminal equipment business fell "drastically short" of
even recovering capital costs in 1974. Kahn & Zielinski, Proper Objectives in Telephone
Rate Structuring, PuB. UnLs. FoRT., Apr. 8, 1976, at 20 (discussing New York Tel. Co.,
No. 26775, slip op. at 75-28 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Oct. 22, 1975)). The commission
found that equipment and other nontransmission services earned only a 0.64% return,
while monopoly services earned 5.21%. Industrial Reorganization Hearings, supra note
8, pt. 6, at 4682 (1974) (Yog Varma, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n). In a recent case the com-
mission considered a special pricing program that included accelerated depreciation for
a competitive equipment line, and ruled that if the regulated firm earned less than a
12.45% return on the service, subsidization would be presumed. New York Tel. Co., 12
PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 446, 452-53 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
59. In 1973, the Illinois Commerce Commission rejected Illinois Bell's proposed rates
on the grounds that Bell discriminated in favor of its own equipment by charging more
for message service to customer-provided PBXs. Industrial Reorganization Hearings, supra
note 8, pt. 6, at 4006-08 (1974) (Commission order regarding Touch-Tone surcharge). A
1973 study discovered increases in message service charges in Washington and Oregon
of 17%-40%, coupled with equipment rate cuts of from 17%-37%. Spievack, Communica-
tions Common Carrier Price Competition, in Industrial Reorganization Hearings, supra
note 8, pt. 2, at 992, 993-95 (1973). That study, compiled by an attorney representing inde-
pendent equipment companies, also claimed that an Ohio telephone company provided a
nominal substitution of equipment services which saved customers 40% of the previous rate
"without any change, modification or difference in service offered." Id. at 995. Increases
in service and interface charges without corresponding rises in equipment rates also were
reported in Dallas, Texas. Gabel, Barriers to Entry and Boundaries Between Regulated
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equipment-related costs to justify low rates for equipment services. 60
The FCC's procompetition policy therefore may founder unless the
carriers are prevented from using their position astride monopoly and
competitive markets to support anticompetitive equipment prices.01
But since most telephone company revenues are derived from intra-
state service, 62 and since equipment rates are within the exclusive
province of the state commissions, only the state agencies can detect
and deter such subsidization. Yet many state commissions are uncon-
cerned about the potential anticompetitive impact of rate structures. 63
The state commissions resist the FCC's procompetition policy on the
grounds that the current telephone network is satisfactory and should
not be tampered with. 4 Additionally, some state commissions, ex-
and Unregulated Telecommunications Services: The Equipment Market, in Industrial
Reorganization Hearings, supra note 8, pt. 6, at 3857, 3862-63 41974).
A recent New York ruling involving a non-Bell carrier, General Tel. Co., 14 PUn. U.
REP. (PUR) 4TH 125 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976), denied the carrier's request for
44%-48% increases in service rates coupled with an increase in equipment rates of 11%.
The Commission found that the carrier would have to raise its equipment rates by 25%
to "ensure that the burden of any possible PBX revenue deficiency will not be borne by
basic service users." Id. at 138.
60. For example, Pacific Northwest Bell estimated its equipment-maintenance costs at
$453,000 in a 1973 ratemaking proceeding, but in its annual report to the Oregon Public
Utility Commission the firm cited actual maintenance expenses of over $1 million.
Gabel, supra note 59, at 3865-66. In a 1973 rate request, Michigan Bell used 1973 wage
figures to estimate the costs of offering monopoly services, but lower 1970 wage figures
to estimate the costs of offering equipment services. Id. at 3868.
61. W. Jones, Interconnection of Customer Owned Equipment with the Telephone
Network (Jan. 25, 1973), reprinted in Industrial Reorganization Hearings, supra note 8,
pt. 5, at 3813, 3819 (1974).
62. In 1974, the common carriers earned $13.9 billion from toll service, a substantial
part of which was intrastate, and $14.1 billion from local telephone service. FCC,
STATISTICS OF THE COMMON CARRIERS 20 (1975).
63. In a 1973 rate proceeding, the Oregon Public Utility Commissioner refused to
consider a contention that Pacific Northwest Bell's rates permitted subsidization on the
grounds that "it is not the Commission's place to determine whether [Pacific North-
west's] pricing policy results in lower rates than its unregulated competitors." Gabel,
supra note 59, at 3866. Both the Chairman of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
and the head of the Georgia Public Service Commission, who was then president of
NARUC, have strongly opposed interconnection. Wiggins, A Regulator Looks at Coin-
petition, TELEPHONY, Nov. 12, 1973, at 46; An Interconnect Dialog, TELEPHONY, Aug. 13,
1973, at 43.
Some state regulatory agencies, however, including the Illinois and New York commis-
sions, have recognized the anticompetitive potential of subsidization. See notes 58 & 59
supra. The New York commission recently commented: "We recognize that in determining
whether rates are just and reasonable it is pertinent to consider if proposed rates . . .
may reasonably be expected to be anticompetitive." New York Tel. Co., 12 Pun. U. REp.
(PUR) 4TH 446, 449 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
The Colorado Public Utilities Commission has initiated a quarterly review of the com-
petitive situation in the equipment market. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 13 PUB. U.
REP. (PUR) 4TH 170, 183 (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1975). The Commission voiced con-
cern that the monopoly power exercised by Mountain States, a Bell operating company,
could enable the firm to "subsidize its competitive offerings from the returns of its
monopoly services." Id. at 181.
64. See, e.g., Wiggins, A Regulator Looks at Competition, TELEPHONY, Nov. 12, 1973,
at 46 (statement of NARUC president).
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tremely wary of any policy that might conceivably raise residential
phone rates, have accepted Bell's questionable contention that equip-
ment revenues keep monopoly service rates low.1 Further, commis-
sions may be susceptible to pressures from the common carriers to
ignore potential subsidization.6 Although the political benefits of
keeping monopoly telephone rates low arguably might prompt com-
missions to prevent subsidization, the utilities' political power and
their control over the economic information and expertise involved in
rate proceedings67 make this incentive at best an uncertain line of
defense.68
Commissions such as North Carolina's and Nebraska's which have
openly disagreed with the interconnection policy might simply ignore
subsidization problems. Indeed, the phalanx of state regulatory
authorities pressing the legal challenge to interconnection suggests
that state commission resistance may be a serious stumbling block for
the FCC's procompetitive policy.69 Furthermore, many state commis-
sions are understaffed and overworked, and therefore capable of only
65. See, e.g., Nebraska Challenge, supra note 15, at 16a (Comm'r Gay, concurring)
(espousing carriers' position that competition in terminal equipment "erodes contribu-
tions to common costs from other than basic exchange service and if revenue requirements
are to be met, rates for basic exchange service would have to be raised"); NARUC Report,
supra note 43, at 4487-97 (1974). See pp. 548-49 & notes 40, 41-46 supra.
66. Representative Wirth of Colorado recently noted: "You don't have to be an astute
politician to see that it is easier for the telephone industry to exert pressure on the state
PUCs (Public Utility Commissions) than on the Federal Communications Commission
. ...." Boston Herald Advertiser, Sept. 26, 1976, § 2, at 32, col. 3. The telephone industry's
ability to generate political pressure, even at the federal level, is generally acknowledged.
See Bus. WEEK, Mar. 15, 1976, at 82; NAT'L J., July 17, 1976, at 1011; N.Y. Times, June
14, 1976, at 51, col. 7. The oft-noted cross-pollination of personnel between regulator and
regulated increases the utilities' sway over the commissions. In 1971, the Executive
Secretary, Counsel, and three other employees of the Colorado Public Utility Commission
were former officials of one of the state's utilities. Three of the 10 PUC Commissioners
in Indiana leaving the agency before 1974 took jobs with utilities in the state. COsuaON
CAUSE, MONLY, SECRECY, AND STATE UTILITY REGULATION 18-19 (1976).
67. See notes 70 & 71 infra.
68. The commissions' desire to keep residential rates low is most visible in separations
disputes (discussed at note 10 supra), but the utilities exert countervailing pressure for
higher rates. The most convincing model of regulatory behavior is Professor Hilton's
"minimal squawk" theory. Hilton, The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions, in
Papers & Proceedings of the 84th Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association,
62 Axi. EcoN. REv., May 1972, at 47. Given the nature of rate regulation and the limited
tenure of public utility commissioners, Hilton suggests that the agencies take a short-run
approach to problems, designed to minimize hostility from the regulated industry, and,
secondarily, from the public at large.
69. See North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976). In the
FCC's Telerent proceeding, Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204, 29 RAD. REG. (P-H)
2D 553 (1974), the North Carolina and Nebraska commissions were supported by amicus
briefs from 10 other state commissions (Missouri, Georgia, Ohio, Maryland, Michigan,
Oregon, Washington, Wyoming, Alabama, and Tennessee), id. at 209 n.8, 29 RAD. REG.
(P-H) 2D at 558 n.8, the Southeastern Association of Regulatory Utilities Commissioners,
and NARUC. Id. at 204, 29 RD. REG. (P-H) 2D at 553.
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limited oversight of intrastate telephone rates.70 The analysis essential
for monitoring subsidization demands a level of expertise that many
state commissions may lack.71
III. A Proposal
Although the FCC's jurisdictional claims were sustained by the
Telerent court, the procompetition policy underlying them is still in
jeopardy. Since the FCC has no authority over intrastate phone rates,
it cannot effectively police subsidization in equipment markets. If
interconnection is to survive as a national policy, both administrative
and legislative intervention are required. To facilitate state monitoring
of subsidization, the FCC should convene a federal-state Joint Board
which would promulgate guidelines for subsidization review. Also,
Congress should give the FCC limited authority to review and disallow
state-ordered rate realignments that have an anticompetitive impact.
72
70. The Council of State Governments reported that in 1976 the state public utilities
commissions-charged with supervising electricity, water, and transportation industries
as well as communications-employed approximately 7,100 people. COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 439 (1976). Figures are not available indicating
what proportion of the state regulatory staffs are concerned with communications, but
NARUC, REPORT ON UTILITY AND CARRIER REGULATION (1974) provides some insights. The
Maine utility commission employed 26 people, four of whom were in the electric and
telephone department. Wisconsin had 120 regulatory employees, 15 of whom worked on
all "utilities." Only the New York commission had a separate division for communica-
tions, with 92 employees.
State commissions have been criticized for delay, incompetence, and procarrier bias.
Industrial Reorganization Hearings, supra note 8, pt. 5, at 3735-37 (1974) (T. Craver,
Litton Indus., Inc.). See Nelson, Practical Problems of Marginal-Cost Pricing in Public
Enterprises: The United States, in PRICES: ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY
135, 136 (A. Phillips & 0. Williamson eds. 1967) (commissions have incentives to avoid
difficult analytical issues in ratemaking); see generally Trebing, supra note 3, at 318
(common carriers have upper hand in rate proceedings).
71. See Phillips, The Effectiveness of State Commission Regulation, in A CRITIQUE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 71, 81 (IV. Samuels & H. Trebing eds.
1972) (need for more and better staffing of state commissions); Troxel, Telephone Regula-
tion in Michigan, in UTILITY REGULATION 141, 150 (V. Shepherd & T. Gies eds. 1966)
(state commissions lack properly trained personnel).
72. A possible alternative policy would require the carriers to set up independent
equipment subsidiaries to lease or sell equipment and thereby remove the industry from
the sphere of regulation. See Industrial Reorganization Hearings, supra note 8, pt. 5, at
3759-60 (1974) (statement of T. Craver, Litton Indus., Inc.); Irwin, Future Dimensions of
Communications Regulation, PUB. UTILs. FORT., Oct. 7, 1976, at 21-24. The FCC imposed
such a requirement when carriers tried to enter the data processing field. See note 4
supra. This approach, however, has possible drawbacks. Because the carriers have
operated in equipment markets for many years, separation would entail significant costs
(e.g., fragmentation of management, personnel, and equipment facilities) and would
sacrifice any economies of integration in the provision of both equipment and monopoly
services. Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1,
2-10 (1959). Cf. Divestiture Proceedings, supra note 4, at 511 (divestiture a "plunge into
the unknown").
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A. FCC Action
A federal-state Joint Board73 would provide the state commissions
with general guidelines, subject to FCC review, for evaluating relation-
ships between costs and rates in both competitive and monopoly
sectors. The FCC would follow existing procedures in convening the
Board and selecting its members, and the Board could draw on FCC
staff and resources.7 4 The guidelines could be based on one of two
methods for setting the prices of regulated firms in competitive
markets: "full-cost" or "long-run marginal-cost" (LRMC) pricing35
The critical differences between the two pricing methods center on
their treatment of common costs, or those costs incurred for the pro-
duction of more than one product line, 70 and historical costs, or those
73. See p. 544 & note 25 supra.
74. The Joint Board would consist of three FCC Commissioners and four state com-
missioners nominated by NARUC and approved by the FCC. The Chairman of the Joint
Board would be designated by the FCC Chairman. 47 U.S.C. § 410(c) (Supp. V 1975). A
Joint Board has the jurisdiction and powers of an FCC administrative law judge (e.g., to
subpoena witnesses, to recommend decisions) under § 7(b) of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1970). 47 U.S.C. § 410(c) (Supp. V 1975).
The FCC's proposed program for certification of all interconnect equipment, see note
5 supra, was first suggested by a Joint Board on interconnection. Proposals for New or
Revised Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Tel. Serv. (MTS) and Wide Area Tel. Serv.
(WATS), 53 F.C.C.2d 221 (1975).
75. The FCC issued a "Statement of Ratemaking Principles" in 1969, AT&T, 18
F.C.C.2d 761, 765-69 (1969) (appendix), which acknowledged that fully distributed cost
and "long-run incremental cost" (LRIC), are the two dominant ratemaking meth-
odologies. Id. at 766-67. The Commission, however, did not express a preference between
the two, and the ambivalence has persisted in recent FCC interstate rate decisions. AT&T
(Long Lines Dep't), 59 F.C.C.2d 671, 689-90, 710-15, 37 RAo. REG. (P-H) "2o 519, 539-40,
561-68 (1976); AT&T (Hi-Lo), 55 F.C.C.2d 224, 245 (1975).
Because of the relative imprecision with which LRIC has been defined by the FCC and
academic commentators, this Note focuses on long-run marginal-cost pricing as the
alternative to full-cost pricing. Compare Stelzer, Pricing in Regulated Industries, A Not-
So-Marginal Problem, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF REGULATED INDUSTRIES 112, 120-21 (J.
Haring ed. 1968) with Baumol & Walton, Full Costing, Competition and Regulatory
Practice, 82 YALE LJ. 639, 639 (1973). LRIC was initially proposed as an alternative to
pure marginal-cost pricing in decreasing-cost industries, because, in the absence of govern-
mental subsidies, marginal cost will always be below average cost at the relevant rates of
output. Thus, total costs will not be recovered. Stelzer, supra, at 117. Use of LRIC as a
pricing floor would allow the carrier to cover its average costs, while still permitting
demand-sensitive pricing. Id. at 132-33. Additionally, pure marginal-cost pricing requires
evaluation of the cost of an additional unit of output, while in the real world a regulated
firm must decide on capital expansion which entails large increases in productive capacity.
This "lumpiness" in expansion increases the complexity of marginal-cost pricing. I A.
KAHN, supra note 28, at 75-77. AT&T has defined LRIC as "the increase in total costs of
investment and expenses which would be incurred by the addition of a particular class
or group of services," adding that for any single service, long-run incremental costs "will
be equal to the sum of the long run marginal costs of the added units of services."
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Behalf of the Airline Industry
Parties at 41, AT&T, 41 F.C.C.2d 593 (1973).
76. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 28, at 77-78. For operating telephone companies, costs com-
mon to both equipment and transmission services would include overhead such as ac-
counting or legal services.
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past capital costs embodied in existing plant.77
Full-cost pricing allocates historical and common costs among
product lines according to their variable costs or some common
physical measure of utilization78 In so doing, full-cost pricing sub-
stantially curbs potential subsidization.7 9 It can, however, burden the
regulated firm's competitive services with costs unrelated to those
services.80 For example, a full-cost regime might allocate capital costs
on the basis of the proportion of the firm's revenues each service
produces, rather than according to the capital actually required to gen-
erate each service. The carriers could thus be at a disadvantage in a
competitive equipment market, since their prices might reflect some
of the capital costs of monopoly services, costs obviously not borne by
independent equipment manufacturers. Yet, the procompetition policy
behind interconnection is undermined if any class of potential market
participants is prevented from competing effectively.81
LRMG-which excludes historic capital costs and common costs not
incurred directly in the production of the new services 2-is particularly
useful as a pricing floor for goods in competitive markets.8 3 Under
LRMC pricing, the regulated firm may earn less revenue per unit on
77. As a result of traditionally low depreciation rates used in rate calculations, tele-
phone utilities generally carry a high level of historic costs on their books of account. 2
A. KAHN, supra note 28, at 146, 150.
78. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 29, at 75-77, 537-68; 1 A. KAHN, supra note 28, at 150-58.
79. See Noll & Rivlin, supra note 52, at 1434.
80. Baumol & Walton, supra note 75, at 641-42.
81. In a recent discussion of rate making for a regulated firm's competitive services,
the Colorado Public Utilities Commission stated:
It is the commission's aim to prevent . . . cross-subsidization of respondent's com-
petitive services by respondent's monopoly services. However, an equally undesirable
pricing mechanism is . . . the setting of prices above costs . . . . Such prices main-
tain rates above lowest possible costs and therefore permit survival of inefficient
firms.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 13 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 170, 181 (Colo. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n 1975).
AT&T has complained that the FCC has hamstrung AT&T's competitive responses
in other telecommunications markets. For example, the Commission delayed AT&T's use
of satellites for private-line communications, Establishment of Domestic Communications-
Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, 851-52, 24 RAD. REG.
(P-H) 2D 1942, 1950-51 (1972), and also held up AT&T's entry into data transmission
markets. AT&T, 50 F.C.C.2d 501, 511-12 (1974). Carrier Regulation Hearings, supra note
41, at 272-74 (statement of Prof. E.V. Rostow).
82. Kahn suggests that a practical pricing rule using LRMC would combine two
elements: the short-term average variable costs per unit of sale associated with a large,
expected, incremental block of sales and the "estimated additional capital costs per unit,
for the additional capacity that will have to be constructed if sales at that price are ex-
pected to continue over time or to grow." 1 A. KAHN, supra note 28, at 84-85. Both
elements would represent an average over "some period of years extending into the
future." Id. As Kahn emphasizes, absolute precision in such estimates would require costly
data collection, but approximation of LRMC should produce valuable efficiency gains.
See id. at 86.
83. Id. at 142-43, 158; Stelzer, supra note 75, at 121.
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its competitive lines than it would with full-cost pricing. But if demand
for the competitive goods is sufficiently elastic-that is, if demand in-
creases substantially in response to a decrease in price84-the higher
volume of business should increase the firm's net revenues.8 Thus,
earnings are generated to apply to common and historic costs that
would probably be borne solely by monopoly customers if the
regulated firm were required to employ full-cost pricing in its com-
petitive markets.80 With LRMC pricing, the regulated firm enters
competitive markets without an overhang of capital costs from its
monopoly business. And by including in its price those capital and
variable expenses directly incurred in the production and merchandis-
ing of terminal equipment, LRMC pricing should limit subsidiza-
tion.8 7 The resulting rate structure should parallel that of any new
entrant in the market.8
Admittedly, LRMC pricing is more complicated than full-cost
pricing, requiring regulators to evaluate carefully the utility's cost
allocations service by service.89 Implementation of LRMC pricing also
84. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 50, at 379-80.
85. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 28, at 137-42; Stelzer, supra note 75, at 121.
86. Baumol, Eckstein 8: Kahn, supra note 8, at 1344-45, 1348-49, suggests that in order
to determine whether a service is compensatory the regulator should simply evaluate the
impact on the firm of termination of the service. If rates on remaining services would
have to be adjusted upward, the service is not a burden on other customers.
87. See I A. KAHN, supra note 28, at 85.
88. The contrast between full-cost pricing and LRMC pricing can be illustrated with
an example adapted from Baumol & Walton, supra note 75, at 640-41. Assume that the
Gong Telephone Company will incur costs of $20 million if it provides message trans-
mission service (M) to its monopoly customers, or costs of $10 million if it offers equip-
ment services (E) in competitive markets. If Gong provides both M and E, however, the
total costs will be $25 million. Thus, the long-run marginal cost of offering M, if E is
already being produced, is $15 million, while the LRMC for E is $5 million if M is
already being offered. The combined LRMCs for M and E are only $20 million, $5
million less than total production costs of $25 million.
If Gong uses full-cost pricing, the $5 million of common costs will be divided by some
arbitrary method. For example, if common costs are apportioned according to the ratio
of the LRMCs of each service (15/5), Gong will have to recover $6.25 million from. its
sales of E, and $18.75 million from sales of M.
But if consumers of E, which is a competitive service, will not pay more than, say, $5.5
million for it, then Gong would be unable to remain in the equipment business, and
the cost of Af would rise to $20 million. If Gong will lower its price for E to $5.5 million,
however, it can remain in the market for E, and consumers of M will have to pay only
$19.5 million. Thus, so long as Gong's LRMC for equipment is recovered, pricing E
below full cost will benefit monopoly consumers. By recovering its LRMC on E, with
common costs absorbed by the product line with lower demand elasticity, Gong follows
the pricing policy of a competitive firm.
89. Stelzer, supra note 75, at 133-35; Noll & Rivlin, supra note 52, at 1429. The rela-
tive simplicity of full-cost calculations has commended the method to most regulatory
agencies. Id. at 1432.
LRMC calculations would require breakdowns of capital and operating expenses ac-
cording to product line, information not generally available in the industry. See note
92 infra. The regulator must combine cost data with demand projection estimates to
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relies on demand estimates that, like the cost-allocation estimates, can-
not always be made with great precision.90 But by promoting competi-
tion in the multibillion dollar equipment industry, use of LRMC as a
pricing floor would generate benefits that can reasonably be expected
to outweigh the increased administrative costs.91 Further, the Joint
Board can minimize that increase by reducing the principles of LRMC
pricing to operational terms accessible to the state commissions.
2
B. Legislation
Congress should amend the Communications Act to provide for
ultimate FCC review of the competitive impact of rate realignments
approved by state commissions. 93 Such federal review would furnish
the common carriers and the state commissions with a strong incentive
to implement an LRMC standard and avoid subsidization. In addition,
it would be consonant with traditional federal responsibility for pro-
moting competition in national industries94 and would fulfill that
gauge the future capital requirements of the competitive service. See note 82 supra. The
regulator can then determine whether the price for a competitive service covers its
LRMC. Baumol, Eckstein & Kahn, supra note 8, at 1348-49.
90. Stelzer, supra note 75, at 133.
91. For 1974 the state utility commissions spent about $130 million to regulate electric,
gas, water, communications, and sewer utilities, cable television, railroad, trucking, and
bus concerns. NARUC, REPORT ON UTILITY AND CARRIER REGULATION 584 (1974). In the
same year, the carriers purchased more than $1.5 billion of terminal equipment, a figure
that excludes sales by competitive equipment suppliers. FCC, STATisTIcs OF THE COMMON
CARRIERs 21 (1975). One can reasonably predict that the benefits of lower prices, greater
product variety, and increased technological ferment in the equipment industry will
exceed the possible added costs to the states of reviewing rates for subsidization.
92. Efforts have been made to translate LRMC pricing into practical guidelines. Stelzer,
supra note 75, at 133-35; note 82 supra. AT&T has much experience with LRMC cal-
culations, having submitted extensive studies of incremental-cost pricing in FCC rate
cases. See, e.g., AT&T (Hi-Lo), 55 F.C.C.2d 224, 232-38 (1975).
The state commissions would not be bound by the Joint Board guidelines, 47 C.F.R.
ch. 1, app. A at 231 (1975), but the FCC subsidization review proposed at pp. 558-60
infra would militate strongly for their adoption.
A critical step to facilitate state subsidization review would be revamping the Uniform
System of Accounts prescribed for the common carriers by the FCC, 47 C.F.R. §§ 31, 33
(1975), to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, carriers record costs according to
product line. The System of Accounts has not been significantly revised since 1935,
Divestiture Proceedings, supra note 4, at 399, 516-17, and the failings of the current
accounting system have hampered the FCC's attempts to detect subsidization in private-
line services. AT&T (Long Lines Dep't), 59 F.C.C.2d 671, 703-10, 37 RAD. REG. (P-H) 2o
519, 553-60 (1976). A more informative accounting system with more refined cost alloca-
tions would greatly aid regulators by providing a useful data base for calculation of
LRMC. The carriers' accounting practices would still have to be monitored, but the
regulatory burden would be lighter.
93. The legislation would amend Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 201-223 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
94. Since passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975),
the federal government has assumed the burden of enforcing procompetition policies.
Such policies have often taken primacy over regulatory schemes. See Otter Tail Power
Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (local electric utility subject to Sherman Act
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responsibility with only limited intrusion on the prerogatives of state
regulatory commissions. 05
The procedures of the FCC review would be straightforward. Acting
on its own initiative, the FCC would have 30 days after a state rate
decision to determine that there was a prima facie case that the ap-
proved rate structure permitted subsidization. 96 Upon such a pre-
liminary finding the FCC would undertake a broader investigation
of revenues and costs for competitive and monopoly services.91 Dur-
ing this inquiry the proposed rates would not go into effect, but
the FCC would gauge its workload so that investigations in all but
extraordinary cases would not exceed 180 days.98 In the course of a
full-scale investigation, the FCC could, if necessary, reopen the record
notwithstanding regulation by Federal Power Commission); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (bank merger subject to Clayton Act notwithstanding
regulation by banking agencies under Bank Merger Act).
In the narrower context of the FCC, the courts have acknowledged the Commission's
duty to encourage competition in communications when it is in the public interest. FCC
v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1953).
95. The review procedure proposed here does not present significant Tenth Amend-
ment problems. This congressionally-mandated discretionary review is analogous to,
though more limited than, powers held by the ICC under § 13(4) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 13(4) (1970) (authorizing ICC to set aside rates made by state
commission if such rates discriminate against interstate commerce). The courts have
upheld § 13(4) as a valid exercise of congressional power under the commerce clause.
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 284 U.S. 125, 130-31 (191); Florida
v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 210-11 (1931); Wisconsin R.R. Comm'n v. Chicago, B &
Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 586-88 (1922).
Despite its reliance on statutory grounds for resolving Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 2224 (1976), the Ninth Circuit suggested that there
might be constitutional objections to a federal agency's imposition of affirmative obliga-
tions on state agencies. The court held that under § 110(c) of the National Environ-
mental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (Supp. V 1975), the EPA could not force
California to fight air pollution through several elaborate programs. 521 F.2d at 830. The
instant proposal is distinguishable from the procedure struck down in the Brown case
on two grounds. First, the proposal does not create a new range of affirmative duties for
the state, which the FCC would enforce, but rather limits the manner in which the states
can carry out their current ratemaking responsibilities (i.e., they are not to approve
anticompetitive rates). This limitation hardly represents a devouring of the "'essentials
of state sovereignty.'" National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 2476 (1976)
(citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Second, the
burden placed on the states under this Note's proposal in terms of costs and displace-
ment of state policy choices is not comparable to that imposed by the wide-ranging anti-
pollution program prescribed in Brown, or to the burden imposed by application of the
federal minimum wage requirement to state employees at issue in Usery.
96. Such a case might be established if there were rate reductions for competitive
services coupled with higher monopoly rates, or if there were recurring losses in com-
petitive services.
97. The carriers would presumably refrain from changing their rates during the 30-
day review period in order to avoid the administrative costs of an FCC stay of the new
rates. The FCC's failure to act within 30 days would constitute a waiver of the authority
to review.
98. Since the state commissions usually take several months to review a rate request,
further extension of the ratemaking process should be avoided unless necessary. Never-
theless, the threat of delayed rate increases pending FCC review should provide additional
incentives to the carriers to refrain from subsidization.
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of the rate proceeding. If the Commission concluded that the rates
under study permitted subsidization, it would disallow those rates.
That decision would be subject to judicial review,99 but since a find-
ing of subsidization would be one of fact, the courts would accord
deference to the Commission's determination. 100 The state commis-
sions would have responsibility for recalculating the rates to prevent
subsidization. 101
Since state commissions are currently deluged with proposed rate
revisions,102 detailed FCC subsidization review of all rate cases would
require geometric expansion of the FCC Common Carrier Bureau. 0 3
The state commissions-assisted by Joint Board guidelines-must there-
fore play an active role in monitoring subsidization. Still, discretion-
ary FCC review would detect the more blatant subsidization and,
perhaps more importantly, would deter operating companies from
undertaking subsidization and state commissions from ignoring it. The
federal commission's enforcement of the review program would be
structured to generate maximum deterrent effect with the minimum
expenditure of resources. Framed in these terms, this proposal would
require some expansion of the Common Carrier Bureau, but not so
great an increase as to eclipse the benefits of competition.
Conclusion
The proposal advanced here would achieve the most effective limits
on subsidization within the least burdensome regulatory framework.
It would maximize the effectiveness of state commission rate reviews
as well as the deterrent impact of FCC review. The irony of prescribing
greater regulatory effort to ensure effective competition is inescapable,
but in view of the benefits of competition in the equipment industry,
such effort is appropriate.
99. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970).
100. Agency determinations of fact are subject to reversal only if found to be "arbi-
trary and capricious" or "unsupported by substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E)
(1970). In these determinations, "[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971).
101. The proposal in this Note is designed to ensure state commission participation in
monitoring of subsidization. But if a state commission refused to reset rates that the
FCC disallowed, or demonstrated bad faith in the procedure, the FCC could obtain
injunctive relief against the state agency.
102. The Bell System alone won 32 rate increases in the first eight months of 1976,
and Bell rate requests were still pending in 26 states in September. Wall St. J., Sept. 16,
1976, at 3, col. I.
103. As of late 1975, the Common Carrier Bureau had a staff of 220. Hearings on
Regulatory Reform Before Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 84 (1975) (Sen. Metcalf). Its budget for 1976-1977 was approximately $7 million.
THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1977, at 723-24.
Vol. 86: 538, 1977
